A two-part analysis of the climate impacts of Waxman-Markey by Chip Knappenberger at the blog site Master Resource (which describes itself as a “free market energy blog”) concludes:

A full implementation and adherence to the long-run emissions restrictions provisions described by the Waxman-Markey Climate Bill would result only in setting back the projected rise in global temperatures by a few years-a scientifically meaningless prospect.

Part I is here; Part II here.

Knappenberger says the economics and the regulatory burdens of climate change bills are forever being analyzed, but the bills’ primary function—mitigating future climate change—is generally ignored. Using widely accepted models and IPCC scenarios, he calculates that in the year 2050 with a 83% emissions reduction (the aspirational goal of Waxman-Markey) the temperature reduction is nine hundredths of one degree Fahrenheit, or two years of avoided warming. He points out a more realistic climate bill (”politically” realistic, that is) would result in a fraction of these already-negligible reductions.

His bottom line is obviously true: altering U.S. behavior alone isn’t enough.

No matter what you try, altering only U.S. emissions will produce unsatisfying results if you seek to save the world by altering its climate.

As Knappenberg quite correctly states:

The ability of the industrialized world, through emissions reductions alone, to impact the future course of global climate is minimal. If the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, Europe, and former Soviet countries all limited their emissions of greenhouse gases according to the schedule laid out under Waxman-Markey—a monumental, unexpected development—it would, at most, avoid only a bit more than one-half of a °C of projected global warming (out of 4.5°C—or only about 10%). And this is under worst-case emissions assumptions; middle-of-the-road scenarios and less sensitive climate models produce even less overall impact.

No matter that the industrialized nations and the U.S. in particular are largely responsible for the rise in greenhouse gases seen so far.

To make any significant in-roads to lowering the rate (and thus final magnitude) of projected global temperature rise, the bulk of the emissions reduction needs to come from other parts of the world, primarily Asia, Africa, South America, and the Middle East. The problem is, is that these governments are not inclined to restrict the energy usage of its citizens—in fact, they either are in the process of, or are soon hoping to, significantly expand the amount of energy available to their (growing) populations—and in the process, subsuming all potential emissions savings from the (current) industrialized world.

China and India are the big targets:

Without a large reduction in the carbon dioxide emissions from both China and India—not just a commitment but an actual reduction—there will be nothing climatologically gained from any restrictions on U.S. emissions, regardless whether they come about from the Waxman-Markey bill (or other cap-and-trade proposals), from a direct carbon tax, or through some EPA regulations.

Over the first decade of the 21st century, global carbon dioxide emissions have been growing at a rate which exceeds the projected rate from the most extreme scenario envisioned by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – the scenario which, when fed into the world’s climate models, produces the greatest warming by the end of the century, about 4.5ºC.

What nobody seems to be taking into account in the climate change debate is the likelihood that emissions can continue to grow at historical rates.   All of the IPCC scenarios assume that the “developing” countries can and will continue along the path of industrialization and that economic growth in developed countries can and will continue along historic paths.

None of the IPCC scenarios consider peak oil or the impending peaking of other fossil fuels – the energy sources that have powered and enabled industrialization and economic growth as we have come to know it.

The reality of impending energy constraints is beginning to evidence itself. For example, this article in the Wall Street Journal highlights depletion rates in non-OPEC countries.

Norway, the world’s fourth biggest crude exporter, said Monday that its oil production fell a sizeable 7% in April to 1.99 million barrels a day last month from 2.15 million barrels a day in March.

Though preliminary, the data highlight one of the big underlying supply problems in non-OPEC states that many oil analysts believe is likely to send crude prices back over the $100 a barrel mark in coming years. . .

The Norwegian situation is being replicated in other non-OPEC oil producers, such as Mexico and the U.K. These regions are mature and giving up less oil, meaning that keeping production flat is getting harder and harder.

Note the unstated but unsupported assumption that OPEC countries are still able to ramp up production.

The problem isn’t just oil. Coal may prove to be much less abundant than thought. Michael Reilly at Discovery News reports that worldwide coal production could plateau as early as 2025 and could be further crippled as dwindling oil supplies make it increasingly difficult to exploit reserves that themselves are declining in quality:

Last year, David Rutledge of the California Institute of Technology analyzed the coal production patterns of five regions around the world — eastern Pennsylvania, France, Germany’s Ruhr Valley, the United Kingdom and Japan — each of which was producing at less than a tenth of its peak levels.

He found that each of the depleted regions followed a rough bell curve of production; initial production was followed by a steep ramp-up, a plateau near peak levels, and then a consistent decline.

When he applied the same formula to coal data from around the world, the results were startling: the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s maximum estimate for extractable coal is about 3,400 billion tons. Rutledge’s calculations suggest just 666 billion tons.

The problem with the IPCC estimate is that it lumps coal “reserves” which are easy to mine with coal “resources,” which may be impossible to mine. And Rutledge’s study shows that, historically, national governments in the five regions have overestimated their reserves by a factor of four on average.

The good news from Rutledge’s work is, even if humans burn all the coal and oil we can get our hands on, we won’t be able to push CO2 past 450 ppm. Hopefully oil sands and other unconventional fossil fuels won’t add much to that total.

The bad news is that the IPCC dramatically underestimates climate sensitivity – and that we’re faced with a catastrophic decline in energy supplies. Industrial civilization and Earth’s climate could both be toast.

We probably have to get atmospheric CO2 back down to 350 ppm, and quickly. And we have to somehow transition to a post-fossil fuel way of life.

Interesting times.